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ABSTRACT. Were governments justified in imposing lockdowns to contain the spread 
of the COVID-19 pandemic? We argue that a convincing answer to this question is to date 
wanting, by critically analyzing the factual basis of a recent paper, “How Government Leaders 
Violated Their Epistemic Duties During the SARS-CoV-2 Crisis” (Winsberg et al. 2020). In their 
paper, Winsberg et al. argue that government leaders did not, at the beginning of the pandemic, 
meet the epistemic requirements necessitated to impose lockdowns. We focus on Winsberg et 
al.’s contentions that knowledge about COVID-19 resultant projections were inadequate; that 
epidemiologists were biased in their estimates of relevant figures; that there was insufficient 
evidence supporting the efficacy of lockdowns; and that lockdowns cause more harm than good. 
We argue that none of these claims are sufficiently supported by evidence, thus impairing their 
case against lockdowns, and leaving open the question of whether lockdowns were justified. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In spring 2020, many governments worldwide imposed lockdowns in order to contain 
the spread of a novel coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2, and to prevent healthcare systems from 
becoming overwhelmed by an influx of severe cases of COVID-19, respiratory disease that is 
caused by the virus. It is estimated that, on the 5th of April, a maximum of 4.4 billion people, or 
57% of the global population, were under full or partial lockdown (Bates et al. 2020); that is, 
people were permitted to leave their homes only under specific conditions, if at all, and these 
confinements were often accompanied by additional measures, such as closures of schools and 
businesses. Because the lockdowns restricted basic liberties and led to severe economic damage 
(Mandel and Veetil 2020), the question of whether governments were justified in imposing them 
comes to the fore. We aim to show that a convincing answer to this question is to date owing, by 
arguing that a recent paper by Eric Winsberg, Jason Brennan and Chris W. Surprenant (2020), 
according to which these lockdowns were unjustified, is based on false factual claims and does 
therefore not succeed in motivating their conclusion. 
In their paper, Winsberg et al. argue that “government leaders failed and have continued 
to fail to meet their epistemic duties” (2020, 216) when imposing lockdowns as a response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic. They argue for this claim by, first, endorsing the liberal view that, in order 
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to restrict basic liberties, states must abide by strong epistemic standards; for instance, it would 
not be justified for a state to imprison someone for a crime without collecting sufficient evidence 
that he is guilty. Second, they contend that the available evidence by the time of the first 
lockdowns (and perhaps even now) was simply not good enough to justify lockdowns: “states 
relied upon bad data and flawed models, and they lacked the other kinds of evidence they would 
need to justify lockdowns” (ibid.). We will focus here on the second part of their argument. 
Specifically, we will argue that Winsberg et al. mistakenly contend that the influential modeling 
studies by Imperial College London (ICL) were overly pessimistic in their projections of ICU 
demand and death rates (Section 2); that they fail to underpin their claim that epidemiologists are 
influenced by their values and external pressures to systematically produce overblown forecasts 
(Section 3); that they falsely maintain that there was no evidence for the efficacy of lockdowns 
and they make invalid charges against a study that analyzes the efficacy of the lockdown in 
California (Friedson et al. 2020) (Section 4); and that they erroneously claim that deaths from 
lockdowns may have been comparable to deaths from COVID-19 infections in the US by May 
2020 (Section 5). 
The implication of our factual corrections is that Winsberg et al. fail to substantiate the 
second part of their argument, and thus their conclusion that lockdowns were unjustified does 
not follow. Whether the evidence that was available when governments imposed lockdowns did 
indeed meet the high justificatory standards that Winsberg et al. contend are required is beyond 
the scope of this paper, as is the question of whether this benchmark must be met in order for 
democratic governments to legitimately impose lockdowns, although these highly interesting 
arguments are certainly worthy of further discussion.  
2. PROBLEMS WITH DATA AND THE MODELS? 
A central claim in Winsberg et al.’s paper is that there was significant uncertainty 
concerning many aspects of the disease, and sparse data, in spring 2020, when governments 
around the world imposed lockdown policies. In constructing epidemiological models to forecast 
the course of the disease, and the potential impact of various interventions, modelers must thus 
make unconstrained assumptions, or assumptions based on poor data. The result, the authors 
argue, are wildly unreliable predictions, which do not form an adequate basis for public policy. 
More specifically, they argue that the projections of these models are “overly pessimistic” (2020, 
226). The model that forms much of their focus in substantiating these claims is the ICL model, 
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which, as the authors rightly note, had a significant impact on policy decisions in the UK.1 We 
will thus take the same focus in our analysis of their claims. 
The ICL model, as the authors note, “was used to estimate what public interventions 
would be needed to prevent hospital systems from being overwhelmed” (2020, 223). The model 
produces predictions concerning the total amount of COVID-19 deaths (in a 2-year period) that 
will eventuate and the peak demand for ICU beds that will arise under various combinations of 
non-pharmaceutical interventions (Ferguson et al. 2020). The primary claim of the authors is that 
it will not suffice to adopt a “mitigation”-based approach to the pandemic; the policy adopted by 
the UK government until that point (Boseley 2020), under which, rather than interrupting 
transmission completely, interventions aim to reduce the health impact of an epidemic (slowing 
transmission without completely suppressing it), while allowing population immunity to build up 
through the spread of infection until herd immunity is reached. Rather, the authors argue, in 
order to prevent healthcare systems from being overwhelmed, we must adopt a “suppression” 
strategy, in which attempts are made to “reduce the reproduction number (the number of 
secondary cases each case generates), R, to below 1 and hence reduce case numbers to low levels 
or…eliminate human-to-human transmission” (Ferguson et al. 2020, 3). This report was indeed 
instrumental in the UK’s abrupt about-face concerning their pandemic strategy (Boseley 2020). 
Winsberg et al. have two primary problems with this model – first, that it was based on 
unreliable assumptions, and second, that it generated overly pessimistic forecasts.2  Let’s turn 
first, then, to the claims about the faulty nature of the data that the model takes as a basis for its 
predictions. 
Winsberg et al. note that in order to predict the impact of different policy choices on 
demand for ICU beds, the model required (among other data), “inputs for expected death rate, 
hospitalization rate, and ICU admittance rate for each 100 people infected”. However, “[a]t the 
beginning of the COVID epidemic, and even now as we write this sentence,3 these magnitudes 
were not well estimated” (2020, 223). Here, Winsberg et al. cite the WHO’s early estimates, 
which were very high, because, as they note, they are subject to selection bias: these estimates 
were derived from case rates in China, which disproportionately include people who require care, 
which means that “the resulting data are biased towards more severe results”. Thus, “early WHO 
 
1 And, they claim, the US. As the model focuses primarily on projections for the UK, we will focus on the UK here. 
2 Winsberg et al. also complain about the lack of robustness of the model, and that it “can generate significantly 
different estimates even with the same parameters inputted” (2020, 225). But the model appears to be sufficiently 
robust to vindicate Ferguson et al.’s main claims (Edeling et al. 2020); and it has been shown that the ICL results are 
exactly reproducible (ibid.). 
3 On p. 226, they indicate that their paper, or at least part of the section to which the above quote belongs, was 
written on May 19. 
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estimates were extremely high, with fatality rates as high as 3.4%4 and hospitalization rates well 
into the double digit percentages. The correct numbers are still unknown, but early estimates are 
clearly too high” (2020, 223). 
This claim is certainly correct, but it’s curious that Winsberg et al. cite the early WHO 
figures here, when the figures actually used by the ICL modelers are explicitly stated in their 
report. In fact, the modelers assume an infection fatality rate of 0.9%5 (Ferguson et al. 2020), well 
within the bounds of current consensus (see Phipps et al. 2020), even given the fact that survival 
rates have improved over the course of the pandemic (Dennis et al. forthcoming). The 
hospitalization rates are similarly assumed to be much lower than the WHO figures, at 4.4%. 
They present projections for infection transmission rates in the absence of any mitigation 
measures (R0) from 2 – 2.6, with a baseline assumption that R0=2.4, which was a conservative 
estimate at the time (Birch 2020), and well within the bounds of current consensus (Hilton and 
Keeling 2020; Thiede et al. 2020).  
So, it appears that these key assumptions weren’t overly pessimistic. But what about the 
results rendered by the model? Winsberg at al. claim that: 
…the model performed poorly at anticipating ICU demand, which was at the heart 
of the policy recommendations that emerged from the model. Recall that the ICL 
scientists recommended a policy of “maximum suppression” (Ferguson et al. 2020). 
This was the most draconian set of policies the group imagined. They anticipated 
that even maximum suppression would at first barely avoid overwhelming the UK’s 
existing ICU and ventilator capacity, and it would then require cycling the economy 
on and off until a vaccine was available. Despite less than maximum suppression, 
this did not occur (2020, 225) 
Let’s first determine what constitutes (as Winsberg et al. refer to it) the “maximum 
suppression” policy advocated by the ICL team, and the extent to which it resembled the policies 
implemented in the UK. The ICL model considers various combinations of four policies: “case 
isolation” (symptomatic cases stay home for 7 days); “voluntary home quarantine” (all household 
members remain at home for 14 days following identification of a symptomatic case in the 
household); “social distancing” (all households reduce contact outside household, school or 
workplace by 75%) and “closure of schools and universities”. All of these measures in 
 
4 The estimate mentioned by the WHO here is an early estimate of the case fatality rate rather than the infection 
fatality rate (which forms the basis of Ferguson et al.’s projections) – on March 3, in a media briefing, the WHO 
director-general stated: “Globally, about 3.4% of reported COVID-19 cases have died” (WHO 2020). 
5 This estimate is taken from a paper by Verity et al. from March, which estimates an overall infection fatality rate of 
0.66% in mainland China (2020). The numbers are then adjusted in light of the older population demographics in 
the UK (Ferguson et al. 2020). 
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combination, which stop short of a full lockdown, are the most severe scenario considered by 
the ICL team (Ferguson et al. 2020).  
In fact, immediately following the release of this report on March 16, all the above-
mentioned measures (with the exception of closing of schools and universities) were adopted, 
and, in addition, it was recommended that those over 70 do not leave the house (Boseley 2020). 
On March 20, UK schools were closed (with the exception of Northern Ireland, which closed 
schools to students on March 18, and to staff on March 23) (BBC 2020b). Universities were 
never forced to close entirely but most had suspended face-to-face teaching by March 17 
(Stanton and Jack 2020) in addition to implementing other measures such as ending term early 
and cancelling exams (BBC 2020a). So, the measures implemented were not that far off the 
“maximum suppression” recommendations made in the ICL report. In light of this, we can now 
ask, how well did the projections match with reality? Did it turn out, as Winsberg et al. claim, 
that this model’s predictions for “ICU and ventilator demand were overly pessimistic” (2020, 
226)? 
This is a bit difficult to evaluate, because the ICL model presents a range of projections 
for different R0 values, and for different thresholds (for new COVID cases diagnosed in ICUs 
within a week) at which general social distancing and school and university closures are assumed 
to kick in.6 But let’s take the projection which most resembles what happened in the UK. On 
March 20, as outlined above, both school closures and general social distancing were in force, 
and many universities had suspended much face-to-face activity. In the week leading up to 
March 20, ICU cases with diagnosed COVID-19 climbed by roughly 300 (ICNARC 2020). If we 
assume, then, that social distancing and school closures are triggered when new diagnosed ICU 
cases reach this number, and assume, in addition, that R0=2.4 (Ferguson et al.’s baseline 
assumption), then demand for ICU beds is projected to peak at 4000.7 The baseline capacity in 
the UK was 4123 ventilated beds (Mateen et al. 2020)8. It seems fair, then, to say that this 
projection suggests that “even maximum suppression would at first barely avoid overwhelming 
the UK’s existing ICU and ventilator capacity” (Winsberg et al. 2020, 225). However, roughly 
 
6 Case isolation and voluntary home quarantine, in all projected scenarios, are assumed to be implemented in late 
March. 
7 In fact, we might expect actual projections to be lower than this, as case isolation and voluntary home quarantine 
were implemented earlier than anticipated in the model, on March 16, along with general social distancing and 
voluntary isolation of the elderly. Most universities had also suspended much activity by March 17.  
8 Although this does not take surge capacity into account, see Ferguson et al. 2020, Mateen et al. 2020. 
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3900 ICU beds were occupied in the UK’s initial peak in April. The ICL team’s projection, then, 
seems to be remarkably accurate, given the parameters considered.9 10 
Winsberg et al. further argue that “[a] strong indictment of the ICL model comes from 
examining what it would have predicted for Sweden, which has not implemented any 
lockdowns” (2020, 226). They take Gardner et al. (2020), who “ran a model very closely based 
on the ICL model” (ibid.), as evidence that the ICL model must vastly overestimate deaths, 
because Gardner et al.’s estimates for deaths in Sweden, even under the strictest suppression 
scenario that they consider, were much higher than the actual deaths under the public health 
strategy in effect by the time – as Winsberg et al. note, they predicted over 15,000 deaths in 
Sweden by the end of April. This would be a rather strange result, given that the ICL’s most 
pessimistic scenario with “maximum suppression” in the UK (R0=2.6, school closures and 
general social distancing triggered when weekly ICU cases hit 400 and cycled off when they hit 
100), with a densely packed population of around 68 million compared to Sweden’s 10 million, is 
a total of 48,000 deaths over a two-year period. What explains this apparent mismatch is that, 
while it is true that Gardner et al. adopt some of the ICL team’s parameter assumptions, e.g. the 
percentage of hospitalized COVID-19 cases that require ICU, they use a different model than 
the ICL team, whose code is available online (see https://github.com/kassonlab/covid19-epi). 
The fact that Gardener’s model predicts over 15,000 deaths for Sweden by the end of April 
under a strict suppression scenario thus does not entail any indictment of the ICL model.  
Of course, our rebuttal of their critique of the ICL model – the main object of Winsberg 
et al.’s contentions – does not mean that all models that were used to inform policy making 
during the pandemic should have been used for this purpose. For instance, the statistical analyses 
of the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) have been criticized because, unlike 
the ICL model, they lack an epidemiological basis (see Jewell et al. 2020), and they have been 
shown to be predictively weak, calling into question whether they should be used for policy 
making (Marchant et al. 2020). If such models had been the only ones available when many 
governments decided to impose lockdowns, or if a government had so decided only on the basis 
of such models despite the availability of others, it might well be argued that restricting citizens’ 
 
9 We could, of course, take different parameters as our basis – we have noted that Winsberg et al. do not identify the 
specific projection upon which they base their claims, but they do include a graph from the Ferguson paper which 
displays a more optimistic scenario; here, the virus is assumed to be slightly less infectious, with an R0 value of 2.2, 
and social distancing and school/university closures implemented when new ICU cases climb by 100 within a week. 
The projection here for peak demand is 1600 beds; 39% of baseline capacity. 
10 It might be that Winsberg et al. misinterpret the ICL projections as being too pessimistic because their 
presentation is mainly based on a blog post (Lemoine 2020), which also misinterprets these projections as being too 
pessimistic (see Winsberg et al. 2020, 237 footnote 3). 
Draft Paper, 8 January 2021 
7 
 
liberties was not justifiable on these grounds. But because Winsberg et al. fail to make a 
convincing case against the ICL model, they fail to support their general claim that “the models 
and data used in support of lockdowns were poor” (2020, 236) and thus their generalization that 
“governments have systematically failed to meet their epistemic obligations in this crisis” (ibid., 
237) does not follow. 
3. PROBLEMS WITH MODELERS? 
After arguing that the models were flawed in ways that led to overstatements concerning 
death rates, ICU demand, and so on, Winsberg et al. focus on the modelers, providing a socio-
psychological explanation for why they allegedly generated these biased models. They contend 
that epidemiologists are influenced by values and external pressure to emphasize the risks of 
infectious diseases, rather than other ethical risks, such as harmful consequences of measures, in 
particular lockdowns, to fight these diseases: “The consequences to themselves, their careers, 
their discipline, their own sense of moral culpability will be much larger if they underpredict 
rather than overpredict death by disease” (2020, 230). We argued in the previous section that the 
ICL modeling that Winsberg et al. focus on did not in fact rely on overly pessimistic assumptions 
or generate overly pessimistic projections. This finding, if anything, disconfirms their contention 
that epidemiologists are systematically biased towards overstating the risks of infectious diseases. 
But they also seek to provide independent evidence for this claim, by referring to inflated 
estimates of infection fatality rates during previous epidemics, which they relate to 
epidemiologists purportedly being influenced by values and external pressures: 
Given these influences, it is unsurprising to find a great deal of evidence from past 
experiences that epidemiologists favor a balance of inductive risks that leads to over-
forecasting the severity of diseases. The infection fatality rate of Mad Cow Disease, 
H1N1, H5N1, H7N9, and MERS all were considerably lower than what 
epidemiologists predicted. And while SARS 2002 actually ended up being twice as fatal 
as originally predicted, its infectious spread was tiny compared to what they predicted 
(Yu et al. 2013; Wang et al. 2012; Lipsitch et al. 2015; Cauchemez et al. 2014). (2020, 
230-1) 
The cited papers suggest that there has been a tendency to over-forecast case fatality rates11 
at early stages of epidemics. Yet these papers provide an alternative explanation for this tendency 
to Winsberg et al.’s contention that it is due to socio-psychological factors. Namely, they identify 
 
11 We refer here to case fatality because their cited papers predominantly do. According to Lipsitch et al., infection 
fatality rate “defines a case as a person who has shown evidence of infection, either by clinical detection of the 
pathogen or by seroconversion or other immune responses” (2015, 2). These cases may be symptomatic or 
asymptomatic, whereas the symptomatic case fatality rate includes only symptomatic cases. Because asymptomatic 
cases may go undetected, it can be expected that infection fatality rates are at early stages of an epidemic particularly 
difficult to gauge. 
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medical factors that can affect the estimation of case fatality rates; in particular, for many 
diseases, positive cases that are detected first are typically those that present the most severe 
symptoms (e.g. cases with pneumonia and requiring ventilation in the case of COVID-19), thus 
leading to higher fatality rates among detected cases than among all cases (Lipsitch et al. 2015). 
This systematic detection bias explains early inflated case fatality estimates for H1N1, H5N1, 
H7N9 and MERS, according to the papers cited by Winsberg et al.12 These papers also show for 
the above epidemics that, once more was learned about an epidemic (such as true infection 
rates), inflated case fatality estimates were corrected downwards. Furthermore, Lipsitch et al. 
(2015) seek to provide means for identifying and reducing biases, even in early stages of 
epidemics. 
While, as we’ve seen, Winsberg et al. note that case fatality rates may be inflated dues to selection 
bias (2020, 10), they suggest that epidemiologists’ estimates are additionally influenced by values 
and external pressures. Of course, the fact that there are plausible medical explanations for 
inflated case fatality estimates in early stages of epidemics can plausibly be explained by selection 
bias does not imply that Winsberg et al.’s socio-psychological account is necessarily false. 
However, it should be pointed out here that they fail to provide evidence for their account, as 
the literature they cite provides an alternative, “internal” (medical) explanation for this 
phenomenon, and they do not cite evidence that epidemiologists’ estimates are in addition biased 
through socio-psychological factors. It might be noted, furthermore, that an influential view in 
the philosophy of science holds that if an episode from the history of science can be explained 
internally, such an explanation is preferable to a socio-psychological account of the same episode 
(e.g. Lakatos 1970). Because there are plausible medical explanations of some overestimates of 
case fatality rates, Winsberg et al.’s socio-psychological account is thus not convincing on this 
view, and in any case not substantiated by the literature they cite. 
Winsberg et al. then go on to criticize that “[r]epeated cases of overprediction can even be 
diagnosed in single individuals” (2020, 231), claiming that ICL epidemiologist Neil Ferguson13 
“has often overestimated disease dangers” (ibid.) and taking Mad Cow Disease and bird flu as 
evidence for this claim. According to Winsberg et al., Ferguson’s group predicted that Mad Cow 
Disease would kill around 136,000 people, while the actual number of deaths equals less than 
 
12 In their quote, Winsberg et al. also mention Mad Cow Disease and SARS. Mad Cow Disease is not mentioned in 
the cited papers and could not have been subject to inflated case fatality estimates as it is generally associated with 
fatal disease, i.e. its case fatality rate equals one (https://www.cdc.gov/prions/vcjd/about.html). Case fatality 
estimates for SARS were subject to another bias that is due to medical factors, which is caused by delayed reporting 
of deaths and decreases case fatality estimates (Lipsitch et al. 2015). 
13 And the first author of the report on the ICL model which forms the focus of the previous section. 
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200. They cite a 2001 New York Times article, which, referring to Ferguson, states that “his group 
published estimates a year ago predicting that the number of variant C.J.D. cases [the disease 
caused by the agent responsible for Mad Cow Disease] might reach 136,000 in coming decades” 
(Blakeslee 2001, emphasis added). This quote most likely refers to Ghani et al. (2000), a paper 
that was co-authored by Neil Ferguson, which concluded that, under a wide range of 
assumptions concerning the incubation period of the disease, the infectivity of cattle, and 
efficacy of measures to reduce human exposure to infected material, “the current mortality data 
are consistent with between 63 and 136,000 cases” (2000, 583). Thus, contrary to Winsberg et 
al.’s contentions, Ferguson’s group did not predict that there would be 136,000 cases; rather, the 
number amounts to the upper bound of the large interval that is consistent with the mortality 
data that was available at the time of Ghani et al.’s writing. Concerning bird flu, Winsberg et al. 
claim that according to a 2005 article that appeared in The Guardian, Ferguson “told the BBC that 
the deaths from bird flu could be between 5,000,000 and 150,000,000; the actual number was 
around 300 (Sturcke 2005)” (2020, 231). But this claim is not true; according to the cited 
Guardian article (Sturcke 2005), it was David Nabarro, the UN official who was by the time in 
charge of coordinating the worldwide response to an outbreak, who “told the BBC that the 
‘range of deaths could be anything between five and 150 million’” (Sturcke 2005).14 15 We 
conclude here that Winsberg et al.’s claims that epidemiologists are systematically prone to 
generate biased estimates due to socio-psychological factors (values and external pressures), and 
that this bias can be diagnosed in Ferguson’s predictions are not underwritten by the literature 
that they cite. We proceed now to Winsberg et al.’s claims about lockdowns. 
4. ARE LOCKDOWNS EFFECTIVE? 
Winsberg et al. not only argue that the models used to forecast the health consequences of 
the pandemic were flawed; they also call into question the effectiveness of lockdowns as a means 
of containing its spread. They claim that 
a literature search reveals there are no published, peer-reviewed papers demonstrating 
the effectiveness of universal lockdown procedures to combat any epidemic….we lack 
empirical evidence that extensive lockdown policies or maximal suppression work at 
 
14 It is not clear whether the quote refers to a range of 5 to 15,000,000 deaths, or (as Winsberg et al. claim) to a range 
of 5,000,000 to 15,000,000 deaths. This is however irrelevant as the quote is in any case not Ferguson’s, contrary to 
Winsberg et al.’ assertion. 
15 Ferguson is quoted in the same article, relating bird flu to the 1918 pandemic and suggesting that if bird flu were 
comparably fatal the number of deaths might for today’s world population scale up to 200 million deaths. This 
statement should again not be read as a prediction; Ferguson likely made this statement to caution against a public 
health strategy that is based merely on mitigation and treatment, because earlier in the same year, Ferguson’s group 
had published a paper that shows, based on mathematical modeling, that emergent influenza pandemics can be 
eliminated through a different public health strategy that is based on antiviral prophylaxis and social distancing 
(Ferguson et al. 2005). 
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all, never mind that they are superior to other, less draconian practices. (2020, 228; 
emphasis in original) 
Our literature search reveals that there is, by now, a growing body of working and peer-
reviewed papers providing evidence for the effectiveness of lockdowns in reducing the spread of 
COVID-19; the following is an incomplete list: Amuedo-Dorantes (2020); Brauner et al. 
(forthcoming); Bonardi et al. (2020); Dave et al. (2021); Dehning et al. (2020); Fang et al. (2020); 
Flaxman et al. (2020); Hsiang et al. (2020); Huber and Langen et al. (2020); Juranek and Zoutman 
(2020); Qiu et al. (2020). We found one study that purports to show that lockdowns were 
ineffective (Homburg 2020), but it is subject to grave methodological errors (see Robra and 
Felder 2020).We grant that not all of these studies confirming the effectiveness of lockdowns 
may have been available by the time Winsberg et al. wrote their paper, and not all of them have 
been peer-reviewed even now. While peer-review might not be the right metric for evaluating 
studies in a fast-moving pandemic like COVID-19, it should nevertheless be noted that there 
were already peer-reviewed studies available by early May 2020 (e.g. Qiu et al. 2020), as well as 
papers available on selective working-paper servers (e.g. Fang et al. 2020), confirming the 
effectiveness of lockdowns as a means of decreasing transmission rates. Winsberg et al.’s claim 
that there was lack of empirical evidence that lockdowns “work at all” is simply false. 
Winsberg et al. then briefly consider and discard a paper that assesses the March/April 
state-wide lockdown in California, finding that it reduced COVID-19 cases and deaths due to 
COVID-19 considerably in this period: 
The best paper we can find defending lockdowns is a working paper by Friedson et al. 
(2020), but this paper has significant limitations. In particular, it counts drops in deaths 
five days after California’s closing as evidence that lockdowns work. Since the virus 
takes longer than that to incubate, this drop could not have been caused by the 
lockdowns. (2020, 228) 
To evaluate this argument, let’s briefly consider the methodology used by Friedson et al. 
(2020). They use a synthetic control model approach, in which the development of COVID-19 
in California is compared to its counterfactual development in “synthetic California”. This is a 
model, consisting of a weighted linear combination of different US states, that is similar to 
California in terms of relevant characteristics (such as population density and COVID-related 
policies, e.g. travel restrictions or numbers of tests conducted). However, while a state-wide 
lockdown was imposed in California on March 19, in synthetic California no lockdown is 
imposed on this day. This is achieved by only using combinations of states for synthetic 
Draft Paper, 8 January 2021 
11 
 
California which imposed lockdowns at least 5 days after March 19, if at all.16 By comparing case 
numbers in California and synthetic California after March 19, the effect of the lockdown in 
reducing cases and averting deaths can be estimated. By investigating various models of synthetic 
California, made up of different linear combinations of states, Friedson et al. aim to achieve 
robust estimates of the net effect of the lockdown on COVID-19 cases in California. They find 
that the lockdown reduced the number of cases in California by 125.5 to 219.7 per 100,000 
population in the investigated period, and they suggest that it prevented up to 1,661 COVID-19 
related deaths in the same period. 
In the cited passage, Winsberg et al. claim that Friedson et al. count drops in the 
Californian death rate in illegitimate ways – five days after the implementation of the lockdown, 
even though the incubation period is longer than that. It should first be noted that, even if this is 
true, this would not affect their estimate of the reduction of case numbers and it would thus not 
on its own establish that they fail to show that “lockdowns work” – the main aim of a lockdown 
is to slow the spread of infection, thus preventing healthcare services from becoming 
overwhelmed. Yet Winsberg et al. also fail to establish that Friedson et al. count drops in the 
death rate in illegitimate ways. It is true that in their first model, a gap in mortality evolves 
between California and synthetic California six (6) days after imposing the lockdown, and 
exponentially widens thereafter (see 2020, 26 and Figure 12a through 12c); but they 
independently also take a more conservative approach, in which they force the mortality rates to 
be equal in California and synthetic California for 13 days after the imposition of the lockdown 
(that is, for the estimated median incubation length plus the estimated median time from 
symptom onset to possible death) (see 2020, 27 and Appendix Figures 8a through 8c).17 
Winsberg et al. nevertheless seem to believe that it is a significant limitation of the study 
that Friedson et al. also include the less conservative approach in their paper, in which death 
rates drop before the lockdown could have caused them to drop. However, this does not 
invalidate Friedson et al.’s methodology, because the causal mechanisms that may have led to the 
decline in the death rate may be complex; for instance, people might have changed their 
behavior, by increasing social distancing, even prior to the state-wide lockdown, which seems 
plausible as, for instance, a state of emergency was declared two weeks prior to the state-wide 
lockdown (Office of Governor Gavin Newsom 2020). Thus, for a convincing critique of 
 
16 It should be noted that, by including states that imposed lockdowns on 24 March or later, rather than only states 
that did not impose lockdowns at all during the period investigated, Friedson et al. generate conservative estimates. 
17 Their estimates of the median incubation period and median period from symptom onset to near-death follow 
Lauer et al. (2020) and Wang et al. (2020), respectively. 
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Friedson et al.’s methodology, Winsberg et al. would have to show – which they don’t – that 
lockdowns had no additional effect on the death rate declining.18 
Summing up, Winsberg et al. fail to acknowledge literature confirming the effectiveness of 
lockdowns as a means of combating the pandemic, which was available even by the time of their 
writing. Furthermore, concerning the study that they do consider and criticize as significantly 
limited, by selectively choosing only one of Friedson et al.’s models as the subject of their 
critique, and by failing to make a convincing case against this model, Winsberg et al. do not 
invalidate Friedson et al.’s findings.  
5. DO LOCKDOWNS CAUSE MORE HARM THAN GOOD? 
But even if we are to assume, to a certain extent, that lockdowns do indeed prevent harm, 
Winsberg et al. marshal another argument against them – that they do more harm than good, at 
least in the context of the United States. A central claim here is the following: 
 
Deaths connected to layoffs that are the result of COVID-19 might already be in the 
same ballpark as the number of deaths caused by the virus itself (Cordle 2020) (2020, 
234) 
 
Let’s delve into this claim in detail. Here, Winsberg et al. cite a short paper that appeared 
on Linkedin by Vaughn Cordle (2020). In Cordle’s analysis (from April 2020), he suggests that 
lockdown-related layoffs will lead to a jump in suicides and drug overdoses. He provides several 
estimates of the layoff-related death toll in the U.S., based on how long a lockdown will 
continue. It’s difficult to gauge exactly what he means by lockdown, as the U.S. always had 
piecemeal lockdown provisions in place that differed from state to state and county to county, 
but as his analysis here is based on unemployment rates, this is not central to his contentions.  
Cordle suggests, in the grimmest scenario he considers, that if the lockdown extends 
through May, there will be a 31% jump in unemployment (47 million people unemployed). He 
estimates that this will lead to “a doubling of drug overdoses (69,735) and an additional 15,137 
 
18 It is instructive to compare this criticism to the argument Stefan Homburg makes in his above-mentioned paper, 
which has been criticized for containing methodological errors. Homburg argues that the COVID-19 death rates in 
Italy and some other countries imposing lockdowns started falling before the lockdowns could have caused them to 
fall, and he concludes that “the lockdown had no visible impact on fatal outcomes” (2020, 5). In their critical 
response, Bernt-Peter Robra and Stefan Felder (2020) point out that Homburg’s conclusion does not follow because 
the prospect of a lockdown could have led to changes in individual behavior, even before the lockdown was 
implemented, and Homburg fails to show that the lockdowns had no additional effect on death rates. Winsberg et 
al. commit a similar fallacy as Homburg (2020); taking declines in death rates that occur “too early” as evidence that 
lockdowns were not effective oversimplifies the possible causal mechanisms that may have led to these declines. 
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suicides” (2020), thus, we should expect an estimated total of 84,872 layoff-related deaths.19 This, 
Cordle notes, is 63% of the projected COVID-related deaths by the IHME by August 4 2020 
(2020).20 The first thing to note about this claim, in light of what Winsberg et al. make of it, is 
that even this most drastic scenario (which Cordle does not take to be the most realistic scenario) 
does not suggest that layoff related deaths will be in the same ballpark as COVID-related deaths, 
let alone that they were at the time that the article was likely submitted (May 2020). The second 
is that unemployment rates never reached anything near these levels. Although, at the time that 
Cordle wrote, as unemployment reached an alarming peak of 23.1 million, it was perhaps 
justifiable to expect that it might spiral further, it was clear by May that unemployment was 
nowhere near these rates.  
It should also be noted that Cordle’s actual estimate at the time of writing, given the 
expectation of the easing of measures and a resultant economic recovery from mid-May, was that 
15 million people would be unemployed by the end of 2020, which he projects will lead to 
41,067 layoff related deaths (31% of the IHME’s projections for the COVID-related deaths as of 
the 4th of August) (2020). With the benefit of hindsight, we can also see that these projections 
may have turned out to be overblown – it’s too early to say what the lockdown meant for suicide 
rates, but early indications are promising (John 2020; Wilson 2020). Deaths from drug overdoses, 
which have been increasing in the US since 2019, did appear to accelerate during March to May 
2020, but not to the degree predicted (CDC 2020a). 
As Winsberg et al. claim, there are other factors that could lead to an increase in lockdown 
related deaths – the long term effects of unemployment, and untreated illnesses such as cancer, 
to name a few. But there are also positive externalities as the result of lockdowns – premature 
deaths, for example, were avoided by a reduction in pollution levels (Venter et al. 2020). The 
E.U. saw a 36% reduction of motor vehicle fatalities in April 2020 (compared to April 2019) 
(ETSC 2020) and the total number of motor vehicle fatalities in the U.S. from March to May 
appears to have declined as well (NHTSA). Of course, we might question the idea that such 
positive externalities can play a role in justifying lockdown, but this is relevant to the claim that 
lockdown might cause more deaths than the virus. 
 
19 It’s not completely clear when we should expect these numbers to eventualize, but as he compares them to the 
August 4 projections for COVID-related deaths, presumably by that date. 
20 As an aside, this estimate of COVID-related deaths turned out to be a bit conservative, if we compare it with the 
CDC’s figures for the 4th of August 2020 – they recorded a total of 156,311 cumulative deaths in the US by that 
date (2020b). It should be noted, however, that Cordle claims that the CDC, at least as of April, overestimates death 
rates from COVID-19, but as he doesn’t give much of an indication of why and by how much, it’s difficult to take 
this into account here. 




Contrary to the contentions of Winsberg at al., it seems that the modelling that steered 
policy interventions in the UK towards restrictions made quite accurate projections, and they fail 
to underpin their claim that experts were systematically biased towards overprediction. There 
was indeed evidence that lockdowns can provide an effective means of reducing virus 
transmission, and the claims they make about the degree of harm caused by lockdowns are vastly 
overblown. In showing that many of the most fundamental assumptions made in their case 
against lockdowns are false, we have not touched on their other contentions concerning the 
degree and standard of evidence required in order to implement such restrictive policies in a 
liberal democracy. But in showing that the evidence in favor of the efficacy of lockdowns is far 
better than they suggest, it might be argued that the available evidence comes a lot closer to even 
the high standard that they require. And of course, the question of whether their proposed 
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